From Compulsion to Choice: South Asia's Drifting from India to China

Abstract

This article examines the shifting geopolitical landscape of South Asia through the scholarly perspectives of researchers and analysts from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Rather than framing the region's gradual move from Indian developmental hegemony towards Chinese partnership as a diplomatic failure for New Delhi, this analysis synthesizes regional scholarship to argue that South Asian nations "tolerated" India's developmental assistance when no alternative existed. However, China's geometric economic rise presented these nations with a genuine choice—one they exercised in favour of their primary national interest: development. Drawing upon the work of scholars including Chulanee Attanayake (Sri Lanka), Shanjida Shahab Uddin (Bangladesh), Ume Farwa (Pakistan), and Nihar R. Nayak (Nepal), this article demonstrates that constrained Indian developmental dynamics, bureaucratic obstructions, and China's resource abundance made the South Asian pivot not just understandable but inevitable from the perspective of the region's smaller states.

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Introduction: Reframing the Narrative Through Regional Lenses

Indian foreign policy discourse has long been haunted by a persistent lament: despite providing non-reciprocal assistance to SAARC neighbours, why do these nations increasingly gravitate towards China? This question, asked primarily from New Delhi, carries an implicit assumption of ingratitude—that smaller neighbours ought to remain within India's sphere of influence in return for generosity.

This article proposes a fundamental reframing, drawing upon scholarship emerging from the very nations in question. As Sri Lankan political analyst Chulanee Attanayake observes, the appropriate framework for understanding South Asian responses to Sino-Indian competition is not one of loyalty or betrayal, but of strategic calculus. Attanayake's research on how Sri Lanka navigated the power struggle between China and India during 2005–2019 demonstrates that smaller states employ a sophisticated combination of "bandwagon, balancing and strategic hedging strategies" to realize their domestic and foreign policy goals .

Bangladeshi scholar Shanjida Shahab Uddin of the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) similarly emphasizes that for nations like Bangladesh, engagement with competing connectivity initiatives—whether China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Gateway, or India's BIG-B—is fundamentally about development outcomes rather than geopolitical alignment. Her work examines how these initiatives "affect geopolitics in many different ways" while remaining primarily economic in their orientation .

The question, viewed through regional scholarship, is not "why do they leave?" but rather "why did they stay as long as they did?" The answer lies not in contemporary diplomatic failures but in the historical absence of alternatives. South Asian nations tolerated India's developmental approach simply because for decades, no other proximate option existed.

Theoretical Framework: Small State Strategies in South Asia

Understanding the Calculus of Smaller Powers

Sri Lanka's Chulanee Attanayake provides perhaps the most systematic theoretical framework for understanding South Asian responses to Sino-Indian competition. In her analysis of how Sri Lanka navigated great power rivalry during 2005–2019, she demonstrates that Colombo employed a combination of strategies: bandwagoning with rising powers, balancing against dominant ones, and strategic hedging to maintain flexibility .

Attanayake's key insight is that "the arrival of an extra-regional power and India's concern of a Chinese presence has given Sri Lanka leverage in realizing its domestic and foreign policy goals, and relative bargaining power in convincing New Delhi to realize its interests" . This observation fundamentally reframes the narrative: Chinese engagement does not simply pull South Asian nations away from India; it creates the conditions for these nations to extract better terms from both powers.

Pakistani scholar Ume Farwa of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) approaches the question through the lens of alternative development paradigms. Her analysis of the transition "from Washington to Beijing Consensus" argues that China offers a fundamentally different model of development—one focused on infrastructure, non-interference, and tangible outcomes—that resonates more deeply with South Asian priorities than Western or Indian approaches .

The Geopolitics of Connectivity

Shanjida Shahab Uddin's extensive research on connectivity politics reveals how Bangladesh navigates what she terms the "era of competing connectivity strategies." Her work examines the geopolitical implications of multiple initiatives—BRI, BCIM-EC, BBIN, and others—and demonstrates that Dhaka's approach is fundamentally pragmatic: each initiative is evaluated for its developmental contribution rather than its geopolitical provenance .

In a forthcoming book chapter, Uddin and co-author Raian Hossain contextualize the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor "in the era of multipolar world order 2.0" from a Bangladeshi perspective . Their analysis suggests that for Bangladesh, the paralysis of BCIM-EC due to Sino-Indian rivalry represents not a geopolitical victory for either side but a developmental loss for the region.

The Historical Context: Development During Limited Alternatives

India's Constrained Capacity Through Regional Eyes

While Indian scholars often emphasize the generosity of New Delhi's assistance, regional scholarship takes a more measured view. The period of India's "Hindu growth rate"—the sluggish 3-4 percent annual growth that characterized the economy until 1991—fundamentally constrained what India could offer its neighbours.

Nepalese perspectives on this period, as analyzed by Dr. Nihar R. Nayak in his work for the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, reveal a consistent pattern: Nepal's engagement with India was characterized not by enthusiastic partnership but by "quest for an alternate transit country with a view to reducing its dependence on India" . Nayak's analysis of the Nepal-China Transit Transport Agreement, finalized in September 2018, demonstrates that this quest long predated China's rise—it was merely realized when China became a viable alternative .

During this earlier period, India's assistance to neighbours was characterized by:

· Modest resource allocation due to limited fiscal space

· Bureaucratic processes that slowed implementation

· Political conditionality that created resentment

· Limited technological transfer given India's own technological constraints

South Asian nations accepted these constraints because the alternative was no engagement at all. But acceptance should not be mistaken for satisfaction.

The Tolerance Threshold

Why did smaller neighbours "tolerate" this arrangement? Pakistani scholarship offers a clear answer: absence of choice. Ume Farwa's analysis of China-Pakistan relations emphasizes that while Pakistan enjoyed a special relationship with China from the 1960s onward, for other South Asian nations—Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives—India remained the only significant regional player willing to engage .

The establishment of SAARC in 1985 represented an attempt to institutionalize regional cooperation, but its limitations were structural. As multiple regional scholars note, India's dominance within SAARC—accounting for approximately 80% of the region's population and GDP—made it "a natural target of resentment among its smaller neighbours." Yet resentment without alternative remains merely sentiment; it does not translate into policy realignment until alternatives emerge.

China's Geometric Rise: The Game-Changer (2005-2010)

The Quantitative Leap Through Regional Data

The period between 2005 and 2010 marked China's transformation from a rising power to a global economic heavyweight. Regional scholarship documents this transformation through country-specific lenses.

For Bangladesh, Shanjida Shahab Uddin notes that Chinese engagement expanded dramatically during this period. By 2025, Bangladesh had attracted approximately $4.45 billion in Chinese investment across 35 projects . Her participation in the 2025 China-Bangladesh Think Tank Forum in Kunming reflects the deepening institutional ties between Dhaka and Beijing .

For Sri Lanka, Chulanee Attanayake identifies 2005–2019 as the critical period during which Colombo navigated the intensifying Sino-Indian power struggle. She notes that this period "marks a major shift in the international attention towards the Indian Ocean and therefore to the island nation" . The leverage this gave Sri Lanka was unprecedented—for the first time, Colombo could realistically balance between two major powers rather than simply accommodating India.

Beyond Trade: The Comprehensive Package

China's appeal extended far beyond trade figures. Regional scholarship identifies several factors that made Chinese engagement qualitatively different from Indian approaches:

Infrastructure scale and speed: While India debated project proposals, China constructed. As Ume Farwa notes in her work on the Belt and Road Initiative, China's emphasis on infrastructure investment produced visible, tangible results within electoral cycles . For governments facing electorates demanding development, this immediacy matters enormously.

Financial resources: China's foreign exchange reserves enabled lending at scales India could not match. The establishment of institutions like the Export-Import Bank of China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank created funding channels that operated independently of Indian constraints.

Technology and expertise: By 2010, China had demonstrated its ability to lift 400 million citizens out of poverty within a generation. This experiential knowledge, combined with demonstrated expertise in infrastructure construction, held immense appeal for South Asian nations facing similar developmental challenges.

Absence of perceived hegemony: Crucially, from the perspective of smaller South Asian nations, China—despite its size—does not carry the same "big brother" baggage as India. As Attanayake's analysis suggests, Sri Lanka's strategy has been to welcome Chinese engagement precisely because it creates counterweights to Indian dominance, not because Colombo wishes to substitute one hegemon for another .

Contrasting Developmental Philosophies Through Regional Scholarship

The Indian Approach: Process-Oriented and Constrained

Regional scholarship identifies several limitations in India's developmental approach that made it less attractive once alternatives emerged:

Domestic calls on resources: With significant domestic poverty, India's external assistance was necessarily constrained. This reality was understood in the region but did not make it more acceptable.

Bureaucratic processes: India's democratic institutions, while a strength in governance terms, created lengthy approval processes that contrasted unfavorably with China's speed of execution.

Perceived conditionality: Regional scholarship suggests that Indian assistance often carried implicit expectations of political alignment. Dr. Bhagya Senaratne, a Sri Lankan scholar, notes that while Sri Lanka has much to learn from India's systematic approach to studying China, the relationship remains complicated by perceptions of Indian interference .

The Chinese Approach: Output-Oriented and Abundant

China's approach, as documented in regional scholarship, differed fundamentally:

Infrastructure visibility: Ume Farwa's work on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) demonstrates how infrastructure investment creates immediate political dividends. Her co-edited volume "CPEC: a Game Changer," a joint venture of Pakistani and Chinese scholars, documents the transformative potential of Chinese investment .

Speed of delivery: Chinese projects move from announcement to groundbreaking to completion with remarkable speed—a factor that resonates with governments operating on electoral timelines.

Absence of political conditionality: While Chinese loans carry their own risks (debt sustainability concerns are well-documented in Sri Lankan and Pakistani scholarship), they rarely demand democratic governance reforms or specific foreign policy alignments.

The Capacity Building vs. Infrastructure Debate

The academic literature highlights a fundamental divergence: India focuses on capacity building while China prioritizes structural transformation through physical infrastructure. For a developing country, which matters more?

Regional scholarship suggests that both matter—but infrastructure offers immediate visibility and political returns. Shanjida Shahab Uddin's research on Bangladesh's engagement with multiple connectivity initiatives reveals that Dhaka evaluates each on its developmental merits rather than its philosophical orientation . When elections approach, inaugurating a Chinese-funded bridge generates more immediate political capital than highlighting Indian-trained civil servants.

Country-Specific Analyses Through Local Scholarship

Pakistan: The All-Weather Partnership

Ume Farwa's extensive work at ISSI documents the depth of Pakistan's engagement with China. Her analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative Summit and India's "disinterested response" reveals how Pakistan views Chinese engagement not merely as economic partnership but as strategic necessity .

Farwa's research on the role of Sufism and Taoism in China-Pakistan relations offers a unique cultural dimension to the partnership, suggesting that beneath the strategic and economic calculus lies genuine civilizational engagement . The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, with over USD 60 billion in commitments, exemplifies the scale of this relationship—a scale that India simply cannot match given its resource constraints.

Bangladesh: From Reluctance to Enthusiasm

Shanjida Shahab Uddin's body of work at BIISS provides the most systematic Bangladeshi perspective on regional realignments. Her research on the Belt and Road Initiative examines its "strategic rationale and plausible repercussions" for Bangladesh, while her analysis of BCIM-EC explores how Sino-Indian rivalry has stalled a potentially transformative connectivity project .

Uddin's participation in the 2025 China-Bangladesh Think Tank Forum in Kunming, where she presented on "Breakthroughs and Bottlenecks of China-Bangladesh Infrastructure Cooperation under BRI," demonstrates the deepening institutional engagement between Dhaka and Beijing . Her conclusion is pragmatic: Bangladesh will engage with whichever partners offer the most developmental value, regardless of their geopolitical orientation.

The post-Hasina realignment under Muhammad Yunus has accelerated this process, with Bangladesh systematically improving relations with both Pakistan and China. As Uddin's research suggests, this reflects not ideological shift but pragmatic calculation: China offers investment, military hardware, and market access without the historical baggage that complicates India-Bangladesh relations.

Nepal: The Equidistance Strategy

Nihar R. Nayak's extensive work on Nepal provides crucial Himalayan perspectives on the regional realignment. His analysis of the "Nepal-China BRI Conundrum" examines how Kathmandu navigates between its two giant neighbours .

Nayak's research on the Nepal-China Transit Transport Agreement demonstrates Nepal's long-standing desire to reduce dependence on India. He notes that this agreement, finalized in September 2018, represents decades of Nepalese aspiration finally realized when China became a viable alternative . His analysis of Nepalese elections and their foreign policy implications reveals that whatever government forms in Kathmandu, the fundamental calculus remains: Nepal must balance between India and China while extracting maximum developmental benefit from both.

Sri Lanka: Navigating the Power Struggle

Chulanee Attanayake's scholarship provides the most nuanced Sri Lankan perspective on the regional realignment. Her analysis of how Sri Lanka navigated the Sino-Indian power struggle during 2005–2019 demonstrates that Colombo's strategy has been sophisticated and multi-faceted .

Attanayake concludes that as the power struggle intensified, it "also allowed Sri Lanka to realize its own goals and objectives" . This is the crucial insight: Chinese engagement does not simply pull Sri Lanka away from India; it creates leverage that enables Colombo to achieve outcomes that were previously impossible when India was the only game in town.

Dr. Bhagya Senaratne's observation that Sri Lanka has much to learn from India's systematic approach to studying China adds another dimension: even as Sri Lanka engages China, it recognizes the value of Indian expertise and experience . This suggests that the relationship need not be zero-sum—Sri Lanka can learn from both neighbours while maintaining its own agency.

SAARC's Paralysis and Regional Responses

The Institutional Vacuum Through Regional Eyes

SAARC's progressive paralysis since 2016 has created an institutional vacuum in South Asian regionalism. Regional scholarship documents this failure and its consequences.

Pakistani analysts have noted that SAARC has not held a formal summit since 2014, largely due to India's position of isolating Pakistan. This paralysis extends beyond summits—SAARC has gradually lost its ability to integrate regional resources and coordinate action on common challenges.

The consequences are measurable: intra-regional trade in South Asia remains at merely 5 percent of total trade, compared to 25 percent in ASEAN. When institutions fail to deliver, member states seek alternatives.

Emerging Alternatives

Into this vacuum, China has stepped with increasing assertiveness. Reports from mid-2025 indicate that discussions have been held in Kunming involving China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh regarding new regional cooperation frameworks . These proposed groupings would focus precisely on the areas SAARC has failed to deliver: economic integration, infrastructure development, and regional connectivity.

Shanjida Shahab Uddin's research on "competing connectivity strategies" situates these developments within a broader pattern. For Bangladesh, the question is not whether to participate in Chinese-led initiatives but how to maximize benefits while minimizing risks .

The Structural Constraints on Indian Policy: Regional Perspectives

India's Domestic Demands

Regional scholarship acknowledges the genuine structural constraints New Delhi faces. With per capita income still modest by global standards and significant domestic poverty, the resources available for external assistance are necessarily limited. Every rupee spent on a hydropower project in Nepal is a rupee not spent on healthcare in Bihar.

But acknowledgment of constraints does not diminish their impact. For Nepalese villagers waiting for electricity or Bangladeshi manufacturers seeking market access, India's constraints are not excuses—they are simply realities that make Chinese alternatives more attractive.

The "Big Brother" Problem

India's size inevitably creates asymmetry, but regional scholarship suggests that the perception of Indian behaviour exacerbates this structural reality. Smaller neighbours perceive India as acting like a "regional bully"—behaviour that India itself criticizes when displayed by other powers.

Instances of pressure through border closures, subsidy withdrawals, or trade restrictions create lasting resentment that no amount of developmental assistance can erase. Chulanee Attanayake's analysis of Sri Lankan foreign policy suggests that welcoming Chinese engagement is partly a response to perceived Indian heavy-handedness—a way of ensuring that Colombo has options when New Delhi applies pressure .

The Pakistan Factor

India's genuine security concerns regarding Pakistan-based terrorism have, from the perspective of other South Asian nations, frozen regional cooperation. India's position that regional engagement cannot proceed without addressing terrorism effectively holds SAARC hostage to a bilateral dispute. For countries like Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, whose primary interests lie in trade and development, this makes SAARC an increasingly irrelevant institution.

The Pragmatic Turn: Development as Primary Driver

Every Nation's First Priority

The central argument emerging from regional scholarship is simple: every nation prioritizes its own development. South Asian governments face electorates demanding jobs, infrastructure, and economic opportunity. When China offers these things at scale and speed, and India offers them modestly and slowly, the choice is not a geopolitical realignment—it is a developmental decision.

As Shanjida Shahab Uddin's research demonstrates, Bangladesh evaluates connectivity initiatives—whether BRI, BCIM-EC, or BBIN—based on their developmental contribution, not their geopolitical provenance . When projects stall due to Sino-Indian rivalry, as BCIM-EC has, the loss is not geopolitical but developmental—and it is Bangladesh, not India or China, that bears that loss.

The New Regional Architecture

The emerging regional architecture reflects this developmental pragmatism. Platforms like the trilateral dialogues involving China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, various sub-regional initiatives, and bilateral engagement with China offer South Asian nations multiple pathways to development .

These mechanisms operate on the principle of flexible, issue-focused, and results-oriented cooperation. Unlike SAARC's cumbersome consensus requirements, these smaller groupings can actually deliver—and delivery, not symbolism, is what South Asian electorates demand.

Conclusion: Beyond Resentment to Realism

Synthesizing the scholarship emerging from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, a clear picture emerges: South Asian nations did not "betray" India by moving closer to China; they exercised rational choice in favour of their developmental interests. For decades, they tolerated India's constrained assistance because no alternative existed. When China's geometric rise after 2005-2010 presented an alternative, they embraced it—not as an anti-India move, but as a pro-development choice.

Chulanee Attanayake's conclusion regarding Sri Lanka applies broadly across the region: intensified great power competition has "also allowed Sri Lanka to realize its own goals and objectives" . The arrival of Chinese alternatives has given South Asian nations leverage, bargaining power, and genuine choice for the first time.

The policy implication for India, drawn from regional scholarship, is not to compete with China's scale—that is impossible given resource constraints. Rather, India must identify niches where it offers genuine comparative advantage: democratic governance support, institutional capacity building, human resource development, and sectors where Indian technology leads.

More fundamentally, India must recognize what regional scholarship makes clear: South Asian nations are not objects to be retained but agents making choices. Their engagement with China reflects not Indian failure but Chinese success—and the understandable desire of every nation to access the best available resources for their people's development.

As Ume Farwa's work on the Beijing Consensus suggests, China offers a development model that resonates with South Asian aspirations . The appropriate Indian response is not lament but emulation—building the domestic capacity and regional approach that would make India, too, an unavoidable partner in the region's development. But that emulation must respect the agency of South Asia's smaller nations, recognizing that they will choose partners based on outcomes, not sentiment.

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References

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